Heavy duty On the Demands of Consequentialism
Författare | |
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Förlag | Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis |
Format | Häftad |
Språk | Engelska |
Antal sidor | 210 |
Vikt | 0 |
Utgiven | 1994-01-01 |
ISBN | 9789122016113 |
Consequentialism says that an action is morally right if and only if no alternative action has better consequences overall. Many philosophers claim that this is unacceptably burdensome. In this essay that claim - under the name 'the objection from too heavy demands' - is analysed, assessed and rejected.
Different versions of the objection from too heavy demands that have occurred in the contemporary debate are presented. Three principal versions of the objection from too heavy demands are distinguished:
(1) Firm intuitions, concerning personal identity and the meaning of life, show that consequentialism is too demanding. (2) Consequentialism's heavy demands make it self-defeating. (3) The heavy demands of consequentialism prevent it from functioning beneficially in a society since people cannot really accept it because of those very demands.